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Abstract
There are various forms of justice. It cannot be limited to legal justice. This pa-
per explores the potential of traditional justice systems under the Constitution. 
It illustrates the need for a multidisciplinary approach in order to fully realise 
the right to access justice. Through a comparative analysis as well as case law, 
the paper demonstrates how alternative dispute resolution is not limited to civil 
cases, but can be applied to criminal proceedings. Challenges are pointed out and 
recommendations made on how to improve and effectively manage traditional 
justice system.
Introduction
Kenya is a country diverse in race, culture, ethnicity and religion. The pre-
amble to the Constitution of  Kenya, 2010 (the Constitution) is instructive - the 
Kenyan people expressly acknowledge pride in their ethnic, cultural and reli-
gious diversity, and restate their determination to live in peace and unity. This 
Constitution represents what is referred to as a ‘new people-based ideology’1 that em-
braces traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in addition to the formal justice 
mechanism. Traditional dispute resolution mechanisms are described in different 
ways. This paper uses the terms traditional justice system (TJS) and traditional 
dispute resolution mechanisms interchangeably. It argues that the reliance on 
1 Ojwang JB, Ascendant judiciary in East Africa: Reconfiguring the balance of  power in a democratising constitu-
tional order, Strathmore University Press, Nairobi, 2013, 39.
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one form of  justice system to manage conflict resolution can impede access 
to justice. This is because if  there is diversity in ethnicity, culture and religions, 
then it is essential that there be diversity in dealing with disputes. The drafters 
of  the Constitution recognised this when they drafted Article 159(2)(c) of  the 
Constitution which provides for traditional dispute resolution as an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism. The structural outline of  the paper is as follows: 
(i) justice and the legal system in Kenya; (ii) the differences between the formal 
and informal justice systems; (iii) TJS in Kenya; (iv) TJS and human rights princi-
ples; (v) a comparative analysis between Kenya and South Africa on TJS and; (vi), 
recommendations on the viability of  simultaneously administering both formal 
and informal systems of  justice. 
The legal System in Kenya
Like in most African countries, Kenya is a pluralistic legal system. This 
means that there are several systems of  law coexisting at the same time in the 
same jurisdiction among a common people.2 It is the unique historical experience 
in most of  Africa that has led to these mixed legal systems. However, differing 
legal systems also mean that there are conflicting claims to authority from one 
legal system.3 Predominantly, the challenge arises of  one legal system being con-
sidered as superior to the others.
In pre-colonial Kenya, customary law and tradition was the predominant le-
gal system which governed the way of  life of  the indigenous people; with elders 
resolving disputes through informal judicial systems.4 Tradition is defined widely 
to encompass: the customs and beliefs handed down, through word of  mouth 
from generation to generation; or the body of  long standing customs, beliefs and 
practices belonging to a particular group of  people.5 The legal landscape changed 
when the British colonised Kenya and introduced the common law system. This 
led to plural judicial systems with separate laws governing Africans, Europeans, 
2 Pimentel D, ‘Legal pluralism in post-colonial Africa: Linking statutory and customary adjudication 
in Mozambique’ 14 Yale Human Rights and Development Journal 59 (January 2011), 3.
3 Tamanaha BZ, ‘Understanding legal pluralism: Past to present, local to global’, 30 Sydney Law Review 
(2008), 375.
4 Ojwang JB, Constitutional development in Kenya: Institutional adaptation and social change, ACTS Press, Nai-
robi 1990, 19-21.
5 Frémont J, ‘Legal pluralism, customary law and human rights in francophone African countries’ 40 
Victoria University of  Wellington Law Review 1 (2009), 150-151.
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Muslims and Asians.6 The latter system of  law was adversarial in nature and 
unlike the traditional one which was unwritten and usually handed down orally 
from generation to generation; the common law on the other hand was devel-
oped through precedent and written laws.7 Further, the colonialists wanted to 
control the indigenous people and therefore introduced a system of  indirect rule 
where chiefs were appointed to govern and administer specific areas.8 Neverthe-
less, the introduction of  this new legal system did not extinguish the traditional 
forms of  dispute resolution.9
In order to regulate the traditions of  the people, the colonialists limited 
traditional practices to those which were not repugnant to natural justice and mo-
rality. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution continues to carry a similar provision as it limits 
the use of  traditional dispute resolution mechanisms where they lead to out-
comes that are repugnant to justice and morality.10 The Judicature Act11 echoes 
the common law relied on by the colonialists; it provides that courts can apply 
African customary law to the extent that it is not repugnant to justice, morality or 
contrary to written laws. A judicial officer in the formal system usually applies the 
repugnancy rule to determine whether a traditional practice is acceptable. This 
rule provides that a tradition will only be considered if  it meets the requirements 
of  equity, good conscience and common sense.12 
The Constitution recognises several sources of  law. After entrenching its 
own supremacy,13 it provides that any law, including customary law, is applica-
ble only to the extent that it does not contravene constitutional stipulations.14 
Where customary law is in conflict with the Constitution it will be declared void 
to the extent of  its inconsistency. Furthermore, customary international law and 
ratified treaties are also considered part of  Kenyan law.15 Common law in the 
form of  precedent and doctrines of  equity are also recognised as a form of  law, 
subject to the Constitution. The Constitution also provides that all lower courts 
6 Ojwang, Constitutional development in Kenya, 152.
7 UNICEF, UNDP, UN WOMEN, Informal justice systems: Charting a course for human rights-based engage-
ment (2012), 49.
8 Frémont, ‘Legal pluralism, customary law’, 155.
9 Frémont, ‘Legal pluralism, customary law’, 155.
10 Article 159(3) (b).
11 Chapter 8, Laws of  Kenya, section 3(2).
12 Brobbey SA, Explaining legal pluralism in African countries: Ghana as a case study, (undated), http://www.
stf.jus.br/repositorio/cms/portalStfInternacional/portalStfSobreCorte_pt_br/anexo/Explaining_
legal_pluralism_in_African_Countries_Ghana_as_a_case_study.pdf  on 7 May 2014.
13 Article 2.
14 Article 2(4).
15 Articles 2(5) and (6) of  the Constitution.
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are bound by the decisions of  the Supreme Court.16 These laws signify the many 
laws co-existing at the same time and in the same country, making Kenya a legal 
pluralistic society. It is therefore not practicable for one legal system to be applied 
as a means of  administering justice, over and above others.
Justice in Contemporary Kenya
Injustice comes in several forms. Likewise, justice as a tool for addressing 
injustice can come in various forms. However it is difficult to find one common 
ground as the main cause of  injustice.17 Similarly, in a pluralistic legal society, 
there is no single approach of  administering justice which is collectively deemed 
as the key solution to justice. The Romans define justice to mean ‘to give each his 
due’. Amartya Sen argues that justice is not attained through reasoning, instead, 
it essentially involves being sensitive and keen to detect injustice.18 Justice can 
only be attained if  a person is keen on the level of  injustice that is occurring 
yet sensitive to the fact that one solution is insufficient to deal with all forms 
of  injustice. Therefore, in order to administer justice effectively, it is necessary 
to incorporate TJS and other alternative justice systems into the formal justice 
system.
In Kenya, the most identified reference to justice is articulated in the third 
line of  the national anthem which states that ‘justice be our shield and defender’. What 
then is justice in the legal pluralistic contemporary Kenya? This section will limit 
the discussion of  justice to the Kenyan Constitution and its legal system. The 
aim of  this is to illustrate the nexus between access to justice in the Kenyan legal 
system and to demonstrate that in order to improve access to justice, it is impera-
tive to recognise other forms of  legal systems.
Justice is not defined in the Kenyan Constitution. However, it is referred to 
in many constitutional provisions. In the Preamble, the Kenyan people expressly 
appreciate and aspire to social justice as an essential value; in Article 10(2) (b), so-
cial justice is recognised as a national value and principle of  governance; Article 
19(2) provides for the Bill of  Rights as a tool to promote social justice; and Article 
48 places an obligation on the State to ensure that all persons access justice. It 
is clear that the Constitution, not only refers to justice but social justice. Social 
16 Article 163(7).
17 Sen A, The idea of  justice, Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, (2009).
18 Sen, The idea of  justice. 
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justice is defined to mean equality in society or as ‘promoting a just society by 
challenging injustice and valuing diversity’.19
The most comprehensive provision in relation to justice, legal systems and 
judicial authority is provided under Article 159 of  the Constitution. Article 1(3) 
(c) of  the Constitution first identifies the sovereignty of  the people and delegates 
to the Judiciary that power. Article 159(1) of  the Constitution reaffirms that ju-
dicial authority vests with the people and is delegated to the courts and tribunals. 
Article 159(2) is instructive, as it provides the guiding principles that courts and 
tribunals must adhere to when administering justice. These principles are that 
justice must be done to all,20 it must not be delayed21 or administered with undue 
regard to technicalities,22 courts must consider alternative methods of  dispute 
resolution23 and the purpose and principles of  the Constitution must be pro-
moted and protected when administering justice24. Additionally, Article 159(3) 
of  the Constitution provides limitations to the application of  TJS mechanisms.
In spite of  the above principles of  justice under the Constitution, there are 
several challenges which hinder access to justice. Some of  these are economic 
challenges such as expensive court fees, lengthy and complicated court rules and 
procedures, geographical and linguistic factors such as the use of  legal jargon.25 
Formal Justice Systems versus Informal Justice Systems
Article 159(2) (c) of  the Constitution classifies traditional dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms as a form of  alternative dispute resolution mechanism (ADR). 
However, some scholars have argued that it is incorrect to classify a justice sys-
tem with the term ‘alternative’. This is a correct analysis because, in some African 
countries where it is difficult to access the formal court systems, the only form 
of  justice system known to the people is TJS; therefore it is not an alternative to 
any other system but the main system of  dispute resolution.
19 Robinson M, What is social justice?, Department of  Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian 
University, Blue Ridge Mountain North Carolina (2013), http://gjs.appstate.edu/social-justice-and-
human-rights/what-social- justice on 9 November 2014.
20 Article 159(2) (a), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
21 Article 159(2) (b), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
22 Article 159(2) (d), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
23 Article 159(2) (c), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
24 Article 159(2) (e), Constitution of  Kenya (2010).
25 Kurgat L, Ombui K, ‘Factors affecting service delivery in the judicial system in Kenya: A case of  
Makadara law courts’ 2 International Journal of  Science and Research 10 (2010), 1-2.
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On the contrary some authors, mostly from the commonwealth region ar-
gue that ADR cannot be an ‘alternative’ as this term can be positively misleading. 
Instead, they place reliance on court systems which they refer to as the main 
representation of  the exercise of  the sovereignty of  the people. Thus, as Sir 
Laurence Street, Former Chief  Justice of  New South Wales stated, ADR should 
not be considered as an alternative to the court system, but rather an addition to 
the court system.26
The formal justice system is considered formal because it is modern, state 
recognised, laws and cases are regulated and filed and there are accountability 
mechanisms in place to ensure that the laws are adhered to. Informal justice 
systems, on the other hand, are regarded as informal because they consist of  
other justice systems which are not State-recognised.27 However, this argument is 
not entirely true because there has been development in the law in some African 
countries which now recognise traditional justice systems in the Constitution and 
in legislation. Therefore, this system is regarded as informal as it is neither moni-
tored, nor supervised and there are no accountability mechanisms. 
TJS are also referred to as non-state justice systems, informal justice systems 
or community arbitration.28 There is no universal type of  TJS; they vary depend-
ing on the numerous customs and traditions in existence. It is worth mentioning 
that informal systems of  justice are not restricted to traditional justice systems. 
TJS also includes: community based dispute resolution systems, non-state justice 
systems or faith based justice systems, customary courts, community forums, and 
administrative authorities.29 It essentially entails the adjudication of  a dispute by 
a third party who is not a judicial officer and guided by traditions, customs or 
practices which are often not written in statute. Usually the customary courts and 
the administrative authorities are hybrids in nature as they are set up in conjunc-
tion with state organs. TJS has been defined as “all those people-based and local 
approaches that communities innovate and utilize in resolving localized disputes, 
to attain safety and access to justice by all”.30
Informal justice systems have been preferred by communities over formal 
justice systems mainly because they are inexpensive, familiar, and easy to use be-
26 Law Reform Commission, A report on alternative dispute resolution: Mediation and conciliation (November 
2010), 14. 
27 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems in Kenya: A study of  communities in Coast Province, 2010, 4. 
28 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, (2010), 2.
29 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 2.
30 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 1.
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cause they understand the language of  the proceedings and matters are dealt with 
expeditiously.31 To the contrary, formal justice systems are considered expensive, 
complicated to use, hindered by language barriers and plagued by delays in solv-
ing disputes due to backlog in cases.32
Another major difference between the formal and the informal justice sys-
tems is that the formal justice systems are an adversarial process. In this adver-
sarial process, there is usually a winner and a loser. Ordinarily, the loser has to 
compensate the winner for the loss and in criminal cases the accused has to 
suffer punishment for their actions. The main remedies in formal justice systems 
are considered punitive and retributive in nature. These proceedings are usually 
recorded and can be used by a party if  the decision of  a judge aggrieves them.33
In contrast, informal justice systems are usually adjudicated by a group of  
people who are respected in a community.34 They also sit and listen to the warring 
factions of  a dispute and there is usually no record of  the proceedings.35 How-
ever, the proceedings take place in a language that is widely understood.36 The 
process is through dialogue where the suspect and the victim and their families 
sit and are able to discuss the cause and consequence of  the conflict. The adju-
dicators often guide the process and the remedies include forgiveness and pay-
ment of  compensation where injury has occurred. The aim of  resolving such a 
dispute is reconciliation.37 The perpetrators are held accountable for their actions 
through the families and the community, who take responsibility to make sure 
that the conflict does not arise again. This is because the process is aimed at so-
cial cohesion.38 Most of  the proceedings in this form of  systems are not recorded 
and may prove difficult for a party who wishes to rely on them.
In his speech during the Induction Retreat for Cohesion and Integration Goodwill 
Ambassadors, in Nairobi, on 29 August 2011, Kenya’s Chief  Justice advised the 
Kenyan people to avoid prolonged and expensive court processes and resort to 
traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. This statement by the Chief  Justice is 
31 UNICEF, UNDP, UN WOMEN, Informal justice systems: Charting a course for human rights- based engage-
ment, (2012), 10.
32 ICJ-Kenya, Strengthening judicial reform in Kenya; Public perceptions and proposals on the judiciary in the new 
constitution, (May 2002), 7-8.
33 UNICEF, UNDP, UN WOMEN, Informal justice systems, 11.
34 Frémont J, ‘Legal pluralism, customary law, 154.
35 ICJ-Kenya, Strengthening judicial reform in Kenya, 7-8.
36 UNICEF, Traditional justice systems in the Pacific, Indonesia and Timor-Leste, (2009), 4.
37 UNICEF, Traditional justice systems in the Pacific, 5.
38 UNICEF, Traditional justice systems in the Pacific, 4. See also Ozoemena RN, Hansungule M, Re-envision-
ing gender justice in African customary law through traditional institutions, (November 2009), 5.
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indicative that more needs to be done to create awareness on the availability and 
advantages of  using the informal justice systems such as TJS.
The Constitution of  Kenya recognises traditional dispute resolution mech-
anisms enshrined under Articles 60(1) (g), 159(2) (e) and 159(3). Article 60(1) (g) 
states that: “land in Kenya shall be held, used and managed in a manner that is 
equitable, efficient, productive and sustainable, and in - encouragement of  com-
munities to settle land disputes through recognised local community initiatives 
consistent with this Constitution.” Articles 159(2)(e) and 159(3) of  the Con-
stitution provide for traditional mechanisms as a means of  alternative dispute 
resolution, which courts and tribunals need to consider when exercising their 
judicial authority and also the limitations of  applying traditional dispute resolu-
tion mechanisms. As already stated, TJS varies depending on the community one 
lives in and the traditions and customary law that one adheres to. This paper will 
analyse the role of  the council of  elders as a vehicle through which traditional 
dispute resolution can be implemented.
The purpose and importance of  TJS is mainly anchored in both the Pre-
amble and Article 11(1) of  the Constitution. The Preamble to the Constitution 
acknowledges that the people of  Kenya are committed to promoting the well-
being of  the individual, family and the community. This statement points out 
the importance of  culture in the African context and its links to the individual, 
family, community and traditional dispute resolutions mechanisms.
Article 11(1) in turn, “recognises culture as the foundation of  the nation 
and as the cumulative civilisation of  the Kenyan people and nation.” This provi-
sion also compels the state to promote all forms of  cultural expressions. 
As stated earlier the aim of  TJS is to solve conflicts between parties with 
the inclusion of  family and community structures. A reconciliatory approach is 
often used to solve disputes. This is strongly linked to the African context of  
togetherness, where the focus is on the community rather than the individual. In 
Swahili speaking cultures this is known as ‘Ujamaa’ whereas in South Africa it is 
known as ‘Ubuntu’. Put simply, ‘I am because we are’. It is this theme that promotes 
the need to elevate and create more awareness to TJS.
Customary law governs TJS. Customary law is the law which governs a 
traditional setting. The Constitution recognises customary law under Article 2(4) 
where it provides that any law, including customary law that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution shall be declared void to the extent of  its invalidity. In the land-
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mark South African case of  Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others,39 the 
Constitutional Court in determining the custom of  primogeniture as being con-
trary to the right to equality enshrined in the Constitution, differentiated between 
two types of  customary laws; official customary law and living customary law. 
Official customary law is the law which is recognised by a state in statute while 
living customary law is the law which is passed on from generation to generation. 
The Court held that it was difficult to determine the content of  living customary 
law as it changed with times.
Customary law has a significant impact on TJS, since it is the cornerstone 
upon which decisions are made. Therefore, as we will discuss later, if  a commu-
nity relies on customary law and the council of  elders makes a decision based on 
such a law, which is contrary to the Constitution, this will consequently influence 
the validity of  such a law.
In Kenya, although the council of  elders continues to resolve conflict, this 
system is not widely accepted as it sometimes clashes with the formal court sys-
tem.40 By and large, the council of  elders is faced with different types of  conflicts 
ranging from family disputes, land issues and criminal issues. However, when 
it comes to criminal issues, there is a discord between whether the TJS and the 
formal justice system has the power or jurisdiction over all criminal issues. In 
2013, there were several consultative meetings organised by the Judiciary Train-
ing Institute to start a conversation on alternative justice systems. It involved 
stakeholders in the justice system such as academics, government officials, coun-
cil of  elders and civil society organisations. The aim of  the meetings was to start 
a conversation on the importance of  alternative justice systems as per Article 
159(2) (c) of  the Constitution. In the convening report of  a meeting of  coun-
cil of  elders on alternative justice systems held on 24 to 26 June 2013 and the 
Convening report of  the meeting of  government officials on alternative justice 
systems held on 14 November 2013, it was clear that there is need for legislation 
addressing TJS and there was concern raised by judicial officers that the informal 
justice system was ill equipped and lacked the capacity and jurisdiction to manage 
serious crimes such as capital offences. However, the Office of  the Director of  
Public Prosecution First Progress Report 2011-2013 recommends that in order 
to give effect to Article 159 of  the Constitution, all stake holders must participate 
in developing guidelines for dealing with TJS in criminal justice.
39 (CCT 49/03) [2004] ZACC 17; 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) (15 October 2004).
40 Judiciary Training Institute, 2013.
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There are implementation challenges facing TJS. Some argue that custom-
ary laws are repugnant to justice and morality and that some practices are contra-
ry to human rights principles. Article 159(3) of  the Constitution provides these 
limitations for the application of  TJS systems. It states that TJS will not be used 
if  the results contravene the Constitution, are repugnant to justice and morality, 
and are contrary to any written law. The rule of  repugnancy is however, difficult 
to implement because morality is relative, more so in a modern set up. What is 
repugnant to one person in a modern set up is not repugnant to another person 
in a traditional set up. This rule was introduced to invalidate and limit any tra-
ditional laws practiced by the indigenous African communities which they were 
not comfortable with. 
Scholars such as Ozoemena and Hansungule have opposed this repugnancy 
rule and stated that customary law is misinterpreted and in some instances it is 
forward looking.41 This is an important argument, especially in the area of  TJS 
where communities such as the nomadic communities in Northern Kenya have 
devised mechanisms for dealing with conflict affecting natural resources between 
two communities.42 In these circumstances, the council of  elders in two separate 
communities preside over the contentious matter. Further, in some communities, 
the female elders fiercely protect the right of  women especially in disputes relat-
ing to the private life.43
Traditional Justice Systems and Human Rights
The Bill of  Rights in the Constitution provides for a myriad of  rights some 
of  which were never previously recognised. One such right is the right to culture, 
provided under Article 11. Exercising the right to culture includes recognising 
their respect and adherence to TJS, such as the council of  elders. However, Arti-
cle 2(4) of  the Constitution limits this right if  the custom or the conduct in rela-
tion to such custom is inconsistent with the Constitution. One of  the challenges 
facing TJS is that the sentences imposed through TJS are sometimes contrary to 
human rights principles and the Constitution. These include beatings, banish-
ment from communities, infliction of  curses and mild punishments for serious 
human rights violations.44 For example, when defilement cases are resolved by 
41 Ozoemena, Hansungule, Re-envisioning gender justice, 5.
42 Dido AD, Embracing the traditional justice systems in Northern Kenya: Prospects and challenges, (29 October 
2012). 
43 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 10.
44 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 9.
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traditional mechanisms, the families of  the victims want to protect the dignity of  
the child therefore; they secretly deal with the issue.45 Child marriages also dis-
guise crimes such as defilement; however some customs recognise these unions 
and the perpetrators go unpunished.46 This form of  dispute resolution, which 
violates the rights of  children clashes with the formal justice systems which have 
placed stringent laws and sanctions against perpetrators of  such crimes. For in-
stance, Section 8(2), (3) and (4) of  the Sexual Offences Act,47 provides for serious 
punishment for those found guilty of  committing defilement. Under the Act, 
the punishment for defilement of  a child 11 years and below will be liable to life 
imprisonment, for a child between 12 and 15 years will be liable for a sentence of  
not less than 20 years imprisonment and for a child between 16 and 18 years will 
be liable for a sentence of  not less than 15 years imprisonment.
However, some forms of  punishment which may appear to be repugnant 
are actually more of  a deterrent to commission of  crimes. People who adhere to 
such customs generally fear imposition of  curses and banishment as a form of  
punishment compared to imprisonment. To them their very being and sense of  
belonging is the community and if  banished or cursed they cannot enjoy com-
munity life.
The Constitution provides for the rights of  special groups such as: women; 
children; persons with disabilities and; the youth. Usually, the composition of  
council of  elders mostly includes old men because of  the patriarchal societies. 
As such, persons from special groups are discriminated against as they cannot 
participate as council of  elders and consequently, women raise concerns that the 
men discriminate against them during the dispute resolution processes.48 
However, it is worth noting that in Kenya, councils of  elders do not all 
consist of  men only. A case in point is the Had Gasa of  the Orma - who are 
powerful as they impose severe punishment such as beatings and curses and the 
Kijo of  the Pokomo - who have been influential in peace talks amongst conflict-
ing communities.49 Council of  elders consisting of  women only are also valued 
as they are sensitive when dealing issues facing women such as sexual and gender 
based violence.50
45 Ayuko B, Chopra T, The illusion of  inclusion: Women’s access to rights in northern Kenya, (December 2008) 2, 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTJUSFORPOOR/Resources/Chopra_Illusion_of_In clu-
sion_Womens_A2_Rights_in_Northern_Kenya.pdf, on 15 May 2014.
46 Ayuko, Chopra, The illusion of  inclusion, 3.
47 Act No. 3 of  2006.
48 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 9.
49 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 10.
50 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 16.
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Needless to say, traditional practices should conform to the Constitution 
and general human rights principles. As stated in the Bhe case, living customary 
law changes with time and with circumstances. The customary law like any living 
thing changes and that which applied to the fore fathers ought to develop and 
conform to the present time. This should be a driving force to develop custom-
ary law in line with human rights principles and in turn it will strengthen the TJS 
systems.
Comparative Analysis on Traditional Justice Systems in Kenya and 
South Africa
Like Kenya and other African countries, the colonisers in South Africa in-
troduced the policy of  indirect rule as a means to bridge the gap between their 
laws and the customary laws of  the indigenous people.51 Thus, the present South 
Africa consists of  a mixed legal system like Kenya.
The South African Constitution,52 recognises customary law as a source of  
law. Section 39(2) and (3) provides for the interpretation of  the Bill of  Rights and 
states that: “(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the com-
mon law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of  the Bill of  Rights. (3) The Bill of  Rights does not deny 
the existence of  any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred 
by common law, customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consist-
ent with the Bill.” Section 2 of  the South African Constitution enshrines the su-
premacy of  the Constitution and states that any law inconsistent with it is invalid.
In the context of  TJS, the South African Constitution is different from 
the Kenyan Constitution because Section 211 and 212 of  Chapter 12 in the 
South African Constitution explicitly acknowledges the institution of  traditional 
leadership. This is a unique Chapter of  that Constitution because Section 211 
recognises the institution of  traditional leaders in relation to customary law and 
Section 212 provides for the role of  traditional leadership in accordance with the 
Constitution and statute and urges the enactment of  legislation to provide clear 
guidelines for this institution. Section 211 (3) is comparable to Article 159(2) (e) 
of  the Kenyan Constitution, though it differs in wording. This Section provides 
51 Department of  Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa, Policy framework on the tra-
ditional justice under the Constitution, (3 March 2009), 11,  http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/trad-
courts/20090303_tradcourts.html on 11 May 2014.
52 No. 108 of  1996.
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that: “(3) the courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, sub-
ject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary 
law.” An analysis of  these two Constitutions illustrates that there is a bold ap-
preciation of  customary law as part and parcel of  the way of  life of  the diverse 
people. Both countries appreciate legal pluralism as several systems of  law oper-
ate simultaneously. The challenges facing the formal and informal justice systems 
in these two countries are also similar.
One such challenge that South Africa has faced is the criticism evoked 
against the proposed Traditional Courts Bill of  2012.53 This Bill was criticised 
because: first, it recreated the old Bantustan links and provided for boundaries 
which were demarcated during the apartheid regime and regulated by the 1950s 
legislations enacted to legislate the lives of  black people only.54 Second, the defi-
nition of  customary law in the Bill was distorted. Since the Bill created the per-
ception that the demarcations for the traditional courts would bind people to ap-
proach specific courts, yet, in actual fact customary law provides that traditional 
dispute resolution is voluntary and consensual and parties are generally at liberty 
to choose which traditional courts they wish to resolve their disputes.55 Third, 
women criticised these traditional courts because they felt discriminated against-
by the predominantly patriarchal nature of  the traditional leaders adjudicating in 
the courts.56 Fourth, there was a lack of  separation of  powers with regards to the 
traditional leader heading the traditional courts.57 Their roles included the legisla-
tive, administrative and judicial roles and this was contrary to the characteristic 
doctrine of  separation of  powers in the formal justice system.58 Consequently, 
this Bill was never enacted. The criticisms against the Bill clearly outlines some 
of  the challenges facing TJS. The question which arises is: is it necessary to legis-
late on TJS in light of  the living customary law, which keeps changing?
The courts in South Africa have pronounced themselves on the role of  
traditional leaders and the development of  customary law. Kenyan courts have 
also exercised their discretion and referred matters to TJS in land and property 
rights and criminal matters.
53 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012]: Briefings by University of  Cape Town 
and deliberations on process (2012), http://www.pmg.org.za/report/20120530- traditional-courts-bill-
briefings-uct-and-deliberations-process on 10 November 2014.
54 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012].
55 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012].
56 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012].
57 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012].
58 Parliamentary Monitoring Group, Traditional Courts Bill[B1-2012].
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Courts in Isiolo are at the forefront in terms of  developing and adopting 
TJS as a form of  alternative justice systems.59 This is because the communities 
in that area find informal justice systems easily accessible, cheaper and faster in 
terms of  delivery of  justice. The communities in these areas are predominantly 
nomadic pastoralists thus, with this way of  life; formal justice systems are dif-
ficult to access.
In Republic v Mohamed Abdow Mohamed,60 the accused was charged with mur-
der but he pleaded not guilty. However, the family of  the deceased wrote to the 
Director of  Public Prosecutions (DPP) stating that they wished to withdraw the 
case because it had already been settled by a council of  elders. The DPP made 
an oral application to have the matter withdrawn and noted that the parties had 
expressed their wish to withdraw the matter as they had relied on traditional and 
Islamic law to arrive at a reconciliation which was in consonance with Article 159 
of  the Constitution. In arriving at a decision to withdraw the matter, the judge 
held that the Director of  Public Prosecutions has the power to discontinue any 
criminal case against an accused and it was in the interests of  justice to withdraw 
the matter. Proponents of  the formal justice system have criticised this decision 
with some arguing that serious criminal matters such as murder should remain 
within the boundaries of  the formal court process which are better equipped to 
deal with such crimes. Some have argued that the state has the duty to institute 
criminal proceedings after a complaint is made; therefore it is only fitting that the 
same state recognised formal process be allowed to deal with the crime. 
This dilemma has raised the question: whether legislation should be enacted 
for TJS and if  so, what would the subject matter be? Judicial officers actually sup-
port the concept of  using TJS in civil matters such as family law and land and 
property rights. However, with regards to criminal matters, there are differing 
views on the capacity of  TJS to deal with crime.61 Part of  the reason is because 
some of  the punishments given do not reconcile with the crimes committed.
The courts have welcomed TJS as a mechanism for dealing with disputes 
relating to land and property rights. In Lubaru M’imanyara v Daniel Murungi,62 land 
was in dispute, the parties consented to having the matter referred to the Meru 
council of  elders known as the Njuri Ncheke. In arriving at its decision to refer the 
59 Judiciary Training Institute, Convening draft report of  the meeting of government officials on alternative justice 
system, (14 November 2013).
60 Criminal Case 86 of  2011; [2013] eKLR.
61 Judiciary Training Institute, Convening draft report.
62 Miscellaneous Application No. 77 of  2012, [2013] eKLR.
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matter to the council of  elders, the Court held that Articles 60(1)(g) and 159(2)
(c) of  the Constitution supports traditional dispute resolution as a mechanism 
to deal with land disputes. Similarly, in the case of  Seth Michael Kaseme v Selina K. 
Ade,63 the Court of  Appeal took cognisance of  the role of  the Gasa Council of  
Elders of  Northern Kenya to arbitrate a land dispute. These two cases illustrate 
the use of  TJS in land and property disputes in Kenya. This is a unique dispute 
resolution mechanism which should be promoted in light of  Kenya’s historical 
injustices regarding land.
The landmark South African Constitutional Court decision of  Shilubana and 
Others v Nwamitwa64 addressed the role of  customary law, traditional leadership 
and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms in light of  the Constitution and 
the Bill of  Rights. The main issue in this case was whether members of  tradi-
tional leadership can adjust and develop their customs in line with the Constitu-
tion. The first applicant, a woman named Shilubana, was the first daughter of  the 
ruling Chief, known as the Hosi of  the Valoyi community of  Limpopo Province 
in South Africa. In 1968, the Hosi died and since he did not have any sons, his 
younger brother Richard became the Hosi. However, in 1996, the Constitution 
of  South Africa was enacted and the Valoyi Royal family met and in conform-
ity with the principles enshrined in the Bill of  Rights conferred chieftaincy on 
Shilubana. In spite of  this, Shilubana declined to replace Hosi Richard, and only 
did so when he died. 
A dispute arose between Shilubana and Nwamitwa, who argued that he 
was the one to take over the leadership. In the High Court, the judges held that 
only the royal family could recognise and confirm a Hosi and therefore, had no 
power to change the Valoyi custom and confer chieftaincy on another person. 
The Court also found that Shilubana could not be Hosi because of  her lineage 
and not because of  gender discrimination as argued. The Court further found 
that her father had died pre-1996 and had he died after the enactment of  the 
Constitution, the situation would have been different. The Supreme Court of  
Appeal affirmed the decision of  the High Court. 
The Constitutional Court judges were of  a different view, they held that the 
High Court and the Supreme Court of  Appeal adopted a narrow focus in relying 
on the argument that a Hosi is not appointed but born and thus the lineage did 
not allow a shift in power from Hosi Richard to Shilubana. The Constitutional 
63 Civil Appeal 25 of  2012, [2013] eKLR.
64 (CCT 03/07) [2008] ZACC 9; 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC); 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC).
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Court found that the two superior courts had failed to give consideration to the 
historical and constitutional context of  traditional leadership in relation to cus-
tomary law. In conclusion the Court held that Shilubana was the rightful chief  
and emphasised the need to develop customary law to be consistent with the 
Constitution. It held as follows:
“[81] … customary law is living law and will in future inevitably be interpreted, applied and, 
when necessary, amended or developed by the community itself  or by the courts. This will 
be done in view of  existing customs and traditions, previous circumstances and practical 
needs, and of  course the demands of  the Constitution as the supreme law.”
This case illustrates that customary law can change and more so, traditional 
leaders can change customary law to conform it to the Bill of  Rights and the 
Constitution. Thus, the lesson gleaned from this case is that patriarchal leaders 
can promote the rights of  women where the customary laws do not favour them.
In another South African case, a decision of  traditional leaders highlighted 
the conflict between customs and religious views.65 In the unreported case of  
Elizabeth Tumane and the Human Rights Commission v Bakgatla-ba-kgalefa and Kgosi 
Nyala Pilane,66 the Bakgatla-ba-kgalefa, traditional authority instructed a widow, 
Mrs. Elizabeth Tumane, from a village called Monono to sprinkle herbs known 
as mogaga in her pathway every time she left her house as part of  a ritual to mourn 
her deceased husband. However, Mrs. Tumane refused to do so as this custom 
was contrary to her religious beliefs as a Jehovah’s Witness. As punishment, the 
traditional authority ordered that she be confined in her yard for 12 months 
because if  she interacted with people she would bring calamity to them. This il-
lustrates a conflict between cultural rights and the right to exercise one’s religion, 
both of  which are protected under the South African Constitution. This case 
shows how traditional authorities might impose sentences and customary prac-
tices which conflict with other rights.
The two cases from these countries, though dissimilar illustrate some of  the 
lessons and challenges regarding TJS. Several questions therefore arise: what are 
some of  the solutions for including TJS in the formal system? What are some 
of  the recommendations that can be made? Is there a need to legislate on TJS 
without interfering with customary laws? Should there be a hybrid system where 
TJS and formal systems work on parallel?
65 Department of  Justice and Constitutional Development, South Africa, Policy framework on the tra-
ditional justice under the Constitution, (March 3 2009), 27,  http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/trad-
courts/20090303_tradcourts.html on 11 May 2014.
66 Case No. 618 of  1998 in the High Court of  South Africa (Bophuthatswana Provincial Division). 
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Recommendations
This paper has analysed the differences between informal and formal jus-
tice systems and the importance of  TJS as an alternative justice system. The key 
argument is that legal pluralism supports the notion that other forms of  dispute 
resolution should be allowed in order to deal with different disputes affecting 
different people who adhere to different legal systems. It has been noted that 
there are conflicting concerns on whether or not to allow TJS as an alternative 
to the formal justice systems especially in criminal matters and also whether it is 
possible to develop customary law so that TJS complies with the Constitution.
Another major concern which has been raised by proponents of  formal 
justice systems is that there is no appeal system with regards to those adhering to 
TJS.67 This is true, though practically, the situation is different because there is a 
referral system, through which a council of  elders can refer a matter to a court 
and vice versa as indicated in the cases of  Lubaru M’Imanyara and Seth Kaseme. Ac-
cording to the Constitution, appeals only lie as a matter of  law and so far neither 
the Constitution nor any statute provides for an appeal from council of  elders. 
Therefore, the term referral is used instead of  the word appeal.68
There are many proposals for dealing with TJS and formal justice systems. 
One such proposal is a hybrid system where legislation is developed in order to 
regulate how TJS will be carried out and the inter relationship between TJS and 
formal justice systems. However, Kenya could face the same challenges as South 
Africa with regards to legislating on TJS. There are very many customary laws 
at play and synthesising all these laws, practices and procedures for conducting 
dispute resolution might be a tedious task. Muigua also argues that linking TJS 
and formal justice systems may derail the development of  the former as the 
formal justice systems are likely to derail TJS with its characteristic formalities.69 
Further, there have been suggestions that members of  the various council of  
elders should be paid by the State and recognised. 
However, there are many challenges with this approach. Firstly, it is dif-
ficult to ascertain customary law since it is often unrecorded and passed down 
from generation to generation. Secondly, with the more than 40 ethnic groups in 
67 Judiciary Training Institute, Convening draft report.
68 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 12.
69 Muigua K, Improving access to justice: Legislative and administrative reforms under the Constitution, (2012), 
5-7 http://www.kmco.co.ke/attachments/article/110/A%20Paper%20on%20Improving%20A 
ccess%20to%20Justice%202.pdf  on 12 June 2014.
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Kenya, it might be difficult to prove which council of  elders is legitimate and the 
members entitled to sit on them. Thirdly, there is the challenge of  ensuring that 
the respective council of  elders complies with the principles stated in Article 10 
of  the Constitution and other human rights principles like equality and non-dis-
crimination. The situation is not helped by the fact that most of  these traditional 
justice systems are mainly constituted by men. Finally, it is important to reckon 
that resource allocation and policy making is primarily concentrated in the formal 
justice systems which may alienate traditional justice mechanisms.70 Therefore, in 
order to develop TJS there is a need to direct resources in their development, as 
well as drafting of  policy papers in relation to TJS.71 
Ojwang, in his scholarly work rightly states that “the new constitution has 
reserved for the judiciary a central role, as a guarantor of  public interest, and as 
purveyor of  right and justice towards the citizen.”72 A reading of  Article 159 of  
the Constitution indicates that courts are at the centre of  administering justice 
and TJS is an ‘alternative’ where courts can refer the matters to such dispute reso-
lution in the interest of  justice. Yet again, practically, these courts face challenges 
such as backlog of  cases and alternative justice systems such as TJS end up being 
the solution. TJS, on the other hand faces challenges such as a lack of  adherence 
to human rights principles as enshrined in the Constitution.
Having all this in mind, it is proposed that awareness must be created on the 
option of  TJS for those who cannot access formal justice systems for one reason 
or another. Judicial officers also need to be enlightened on the option of  referring 
cases to TJS more so in family, private, misdemeanors and land dispute. However, 
people using TJS must also be educated on their rights,73 as provided under the 
Bill of  Rights in the Constitution and if  the TJS mechanism does not adhere to 
such rights, then they have the option of  referring the matter to the courts. Al-
though courts have numerous challenges, these challenges do not negate the fact 
that the Judiciary is the constitutionally mandated guardian of  justice.
Enactment of  legislation to deal with TJS or combine TJS and formal jus-
tice systems might be an effort in futility. Though, it will not harm to enact leg-
islation binding all TJS systems to adhere to the rights enshrined in the Bill of  
Rights and to regulate the system of  referrals of  cases between the formal justice 
systems and the TJS.
70 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 6.
71 Muigua K, Improving access to justice, 4, 7.
72 Ojwang, Ascendant judiciary in East Africa.
73 FIDA Kenya, Report on traditional justice systems . . . Coast Province, 24.
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In conclusion, in thinking of  ways to carry forward the need to embrace 
TJS systems it is important to bear in mind that injustices affect different people 
from all walks of  life. Therefore, in a democratic state like Kenya, with a people, 
principles and values based Constitution; we need to embrace creative mecha-
nisms of  dealing with these injustices. Sen put it in different words when he 
states that we need to have ‘an accomplishment based understanding of  justice’.74 
He states that 
“the need for an accomplishment- based understanding of  justice is linked with the argu-
ment that justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can actually live. The impor-
tance of  human lives, experiences and realisations cannot be supplanted by information 
about institutions that exist and the rules that operate”.
Conclusion
In conclusion, TJS as a form of  alternative justice system should be pro-
moted in a legal pluralistic society. However, there is need for development in 
living customary law for it to be in tandem with the letter and the spirit of  the 
Constitution. The Constitution is clear that the people have delegated their sov-
ereign power and allocated it to the Judiciary as the guardian of  justice. However, 
the Judiciary has its challenges and these challenges hinder it from effectively 
executing its mandate of  guardianship. Thus, TJS plays a role as a support and 
an alternative in instances when access to the courts is difficult. In light of  the 
differences in culture and traditions there is a need to create awareness with the 
people, judicial officers and adjudicators of  informal justice systems in order to 
educate and instruct them about this other option of  justice as well as the need 
to develop these other forms of  justice.
74 Sen, The idea of  justice. 
